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DAILY LOG

Office of the Deputy Director

11/17/62

Date 13 November 1962

(Monday)

1. The DDP Operations Center was abolished yesterday. A DD/P Senior Officer watch was established at the same time in IWOG. (ER 62-8300)

2. WH Division advises in a memorandum to the DCI that the Embassy in Guatemala considers that, if Juan Jose Arevalo again assumes the Presidency of Guatemala, it will likely open the way to a Communist regime. The Byroade survey group support this appraisal. (ER 62-8242)

3. A DD/I TS memorandum deals with Soviet attitudes toward war; Soviet management of political and military crises; and the Soviet reappraisal of the strategic situation of the USSR. It has been prepared in support of NIE 11-4. (TS#186353)

4. Hilsman Reports: (auralis amoebus, maybeno ?)

a. "Our Major European Allies and the Cuban Crisis"
Different reactions in the several countries reemphasize the fact that Germans, French, Italians and British still hold distinctly individual views of their respective national interests. (ER 62-8208)

b. "Yugoslav Trade Unions Gain in Rivalry With Bloc Oriented Communists to Convene a Neutralist Labor Meeting!"
The Yugoslav Trade Union Federation is conducting a successful campaign for convening a world labor conference of "unaligned" unions, primarily from underdeveloped countries. (ER 62-8209)

c. "Global Alert List for November 1962" (ER 62-8268)

d. "Brazil and the Cuban Missile Crisis"
Brazilian response to the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba was erratic and unpredictable. Despite Goulart's assurances of full support for the US position, he also favored avoidance of forceful action against the Castro regime. (ER 62-8267)

e. "Effects of Mattei's Death on Italian Oil Policies"
The death of the president of the Italian state-owned petroleum monopoly, the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ENI), has already been covered [redacted] (b)(1)

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f. "Implications of the Cuban Crisis for the Soviet Internal Scene"
It is not clear how much the Soviet leadership was shaken by the Cuban crisis. There is no evidence of gains or losses in status. (ER 62-8270)

g. "Western-Soviet Antithesis in the Yemen Conflict"
Possibilities have increased for a military confrontation of Saudi Arabia and Jordan with the UAR. (ER 62-8287)

h. "Asian Reactions to the Cuban Crisis: October 27 - November 2, 1962
Most significant Asian reaction to the dismantling operations came, obviously, from the Chicoms. Free Asian reactions predictably favor the US-UN stand. Once the crisis is resolved, neutral attitudes may reflect more sympathy for Cuba and respect for Khrushchev than praise for Kennedy. (ER 62-8281)

i. "Sihanouk's Threat to Bring in Peiping"
In Cambodia, Sihanouk has almost maneuvered himself into a position obliging him to ask for Chicom military aid, if the West fails to meet his demands for territorial integrity and neutrality guarantees. (ER 62-8297)

j. "Mutual Concessions: An Old Soviet Theme"
Although the idea of compromise has long been articulated as part of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, it is worth noting that the recent Soviet "concession to peace" in Cuba occurred under the one condition that Moscow has always claimed would never produce Soviet concessions: a US threat to employ force against the USSR. (ER 62-8296)

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